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DISPOSITION OF PHYSICAL EXHIBITS USED IN
CRIMINAL TRIALS
The retrial of an accused person when his original conviction has
been set aside many years later, as in a federal habeas corpus proceed-
ing, presents a developing problem in criminal law. The prosecution
may face virtually insurmountable difficulties in retrying the de-
fendant, if, for example, the physical evidence on which the original
conviction was based has been destroyed in the interim. This situa-
tion was recently presented in Pennsylvania, when the state undertook
to retry James Morris Fletcher after the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Third Circuit voided his conviction seven years after
the original trial'
The Case
Fletcher was found guilty of first degree murder and on February
14, 1956, sentenced to life imprisonment.2 This conviction was af-
firmed in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court on November 12, 1956.3
The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari on June io, 1957.
4
On petition of the county prosecutor, the court on July 16, 1957,
ordered destruction of the physical exhibits which had been used in
the trial.5 Fletcher filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the
'Commonwealth ex rel. Fletcher v. Toothman, 407 Pa. 146, i8o A.2d 3 (1962).
Mr. A. J. Waycoff, Atty., Wvaynesburg, Pa., served as defense counsel for Fletcher
and provided much of the background information about the case. His aid is here
acknowledged.
Fletcher was actually convicted on December 23, 1954. Although it appears
that a long period of time elapsed between the conviction and sentence, no reason
for this gap is indicated in the official record or opinions.
3Commonwealth v. Fletcher, 387 Pa. 602, 128 A.2d 897 (1956).
'Fletcher v. Pennsylvania, 354 U.S. 913 (1957).
5The order read as follows:
ORDER
"And now this 16th, [sic] day of July, 1957, it appearing to the court that the
defendant in the above styled case was sentenced on the 14th day of February, 1956,
for life in Western Penitentiary at Pittsburgh, Alleghany County, Pennsylvania, and
pursuant to an appeal taken by defendant to Pennsylvania Supreme Court at No.
117, March term, 1956, said court upheld the conviction and sentence of the lower
court; and that at No. 698, Miscellaneous, October term, 1956, in the Supreme
Court of the United States, writ of certiorari on behalf of defendant was denied,
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Federal District Court for Western Pennsylvania on September 2o,
1957. He contended that his petition should be granted because two of
the petit jurors should have been disqualified. Juror number one was
a son-in-law of the county detective who had conducted the investi-
gation for the Commonwealth and number 7 was related to Gerald
Tanner, the victim of the murder. Because the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania had not yet considered the habeas corpus question, the
proceeding in the Federal District Court was stayed.6 Habeas corpus
was denied in the Pennsylvania court on March 2o, 1959, 7 and subse-
quently certiorari -to the United States Supreme Court was denied on
October 12, 1959.8 The Federal District Court then held a hearing on
the stayed proceeding and denied the petition for habeas corpus on
May 3, 196o, 9 but on February 23, 1961, the United States Court of
Appeals for, the Third Circuit reversed the decision of the District
Court and remanded the case to the District Court with instructions to
issue the writ which would allow the prisoner a retrial on the merits.10
The prisoner then filed a new series of habeas corpus petitions in the
Pennsylvania trial court contending that the murder indictment should
be quashed and he should be given an absolute discharge. Fletcher
claimed that for the retrial of the case the Commonwealth did not
have all of the evidence presented in the original trial. He further
upon motion of Glen R. Toothman, Jr., District Attorney of Greene County,
Pennsylvania, it is hereby ordered, adjudged and decreed, that disposition be made
as follows of the matters of evidence used in such case, that they be disposed forth-
with by Charles P. Meighen, County Detective.
(a) two (2) shot gun shell wads found at scene.
(b) four (4) shot gun shells, Western Expert 12 guage.
(c) one (1) pair of oxford shoes, from home of accused.
(d) one (i) white shirt, from home of accused.
(e) five (5) plaster casts taken of footprints in garden.
(f) one (x) jar containing earth sample from garden.
(g) one (i) piece of right rear fender.
(h) one (i) Winchester, 12 guage. shot gun,, Model No. 37.
(i) Clothing of the victim, Gerald Tanner, consisting of the following items: pair of
brown oxford shoes, pair of blue socks, green shorts, white under shirt, overall
pants and gray shirt.
(j) Clothing of accused, James Morris Fletcher, consisting of the following items,
blue work shirt, gray pants, white shorts and one pair gray socks, that the $4.00
be paid over to the treasurer's office of Greene County, Pennsylvania, and that the
195o Ford sedan, bearing Pennsylvania registration No. 9Ho37, Manufacturer's No.
BOCS 127352 be delivered to the Capital Mutual Fire Insurance Company.
8United States ex rel. Fletcher v. Cavell, 162 F.Snpp. 3 (W.D. Pa. 1958).
"Commonwealth ex rel. Fletcher v. Cavell, 395 Pa. 134, 149 A.2d 434 (1959).
8Pennsylvania ex rel. Fletcher v. Cavell, 361 Us. 847 (1959).
9United States ex rel. Fletcher v. Cavell, 183 F. Supp. 335 (W.D. Pa. 196o).
'0U.S. ex rel. Fletcher v. Cavell, 287 F.2d 792 (3d Cir. 1961).
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claimed that the destruction of the evidence without his knowledge
was prejudicial to his rights and violated due process of law. The im-
plications of this argument were rejected by the trial court and in the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in its holding that:
It has not been shown that the elimination or absence of a part
of the commonwealth's evidence would prejudice defendant;
on the contrary, it appears that it will, if it has any relevancy,
weaken the commonwealth's case in the new trial."
Subsequently the retrial of James Fletcher did take place and on June
26, 1962, he was acquitted, by a jury.' 2
The Problem
In light of the extensive post-conviction proceedings now available
in state and federal courts, the question arises as to whether it is ever
safe to destroy or otherwise dispose of evidence, at least, until a
prisoner has died or been released from incarceration. In Reck v.
Pate,13 for example, the United States Supreme Court in 1961 set
aside a 1936 conviction and remanded the case to the federal district
court with directions to discharge the prisoner, unless the state of
Illinois should undertake to retry the prisoner. Illinois, having no
evidence, could not do so.14 The possible retroactive implications of
Mapp v. Ohio'5 may present further problems in this area. Retrial of
defendants whose original conviction had been based on illegally-seized
evidence may be very difficult, and so the preservation of admissible
items of evidence, those not excluded by Mapp, becomes of greater
importance. It is thus essential that precaution be taken now to insure
the preservation of all exhibits used during the trial. Certainly future
extension of the provisions of the Federal Bill of Rights to the states
will result in more and more habeas corpus petitions and more and
more new trials. Indications are that the right to assigned counsel may
soon be absorbed under the fourteenth amendement's due process
clause. 6 Such recognition would bring forth many new hearings and
"Fletcher v. Toothman, supra Note i at 4.
'Defense Counsel A. J. Waychoff, Waynesburg, Pennsylvania, provided this
information.
1367 U.S. 433 (1961)-
"Ritz, State Criminal Confession Cases: Subsequent Developments in Cases
Reversed by the U.S. Supreme Court and Some Current Problems, ig Wash. & Lee
L. Rev. 201, 217 (1962).
2367 US. 643 (1961).
"Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942) has been subjected to serious criticism for
the past 2o years. Its validity is to be determined in the case of Giddeon v. Cochran,
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new trials. The lack of evidence essential at the prior ,trial and pre-
maturely destroyed or not available at a second trial might well mean
the state would have a weak case against a defendant at the second trial.
Briefly, the broad implications of the federal habeas corpus act as
well as the many state post-conviction remedies indicate that problems
similar to those presented in the Fletcher case may present a frus-
trating stumbling block to the prosecutor who must retry the case.
In light of these problems then, it is worthwhile surveying the pro-
cedures followed in -the various states and in the federal judicial and
military systems in caring for and disposing of real and other evidence
after an initial criminal trial is concluded.
Sburces of Information
This comment is based on information compiled from replies re-
ceived from clerks of courts, prosecuting attorneys, and others in re-
sponse to some one hundred and thirty-five letters of inquiry sent, on
a random basis, throughout the country. Seventy-six replies were re-
ceived from forty-six states, the Attorney General of the United States
and military officers. 17 Replies from states with statutory guides for the
disposition of the evidence indicate state-wide procedure. A reply
from one or two communities or areas in a state, without legislation
only indicates the procedure carried out in one or more sections of the
state, procedures which ,may be dictated by local custom or tradition.
Essentially, this article presents a sampling of the various methods of
disposition of evidence which are used throughout the United States.
General
Evidence seized for use as an exhibit in criminal proceedings is
generally held by the police or prosecuting attorney until the time
when it is formally introduced into evidence during the trial of a
prisoner. Such evidence is then considered to be custodia legis or in
custody of the court. Generally, the clerk of the court handles the
evidence from the time it is entered as an exhibit until the final dis-
position of the case,' 8 but in a few states the clerk keeps the exhibits
370 U.S. 9o8 (1962) now before the Supreme Court of the United States. If Betts is
overruled, the right to assigned counsel will no longer rest on the capital-non-capital
distinction.
"7See appendix for complete tabulation.
"sAlabama, Alaska, California, Colorado, District of Columbia, Florida, Hawaii,
Illinois, Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana,
Nevada, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Caro-
lina, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin,
NOTE
only until the trial is over, at which time they are given to the prose-
cuting attorney.19 In other states, the court reporter, whose function
differs from that of the clerk, is held responsible for the proper main-
tenance of exhibits, which are, in effect considered as much a part of
the official trial proceedings as his shorthand notes.20 No matter which
person receives the exhibits after the trial, each exhibit has been tagged
and given an identification number which it retains throughout the
trial and at all appellate proceedings.
Statutes
After the reason for -the legal custody of the exhibits has passed,
the clerk, court reporter, or other custodian is presented with the prob-
lem of the disposition of the exhibits. In fourteen states, statutes
specify how long the exhibits must be kept.21 Any time stated in a
statute is, however, relative to the phrase, "final determination or dis-
position of the case." It is only after the final determination that the
statutory time begins running. Generally this term means that all
appeals have been exhausted and that the effective appellate channels
are closed. However, as has been pointed out, the possibility of a fed-
eral habeas corpus proceeding is always present no matter how long the
man has been in prison or how many appeals he has taken. It is, how-
ever, speculative from a reading of the statutes as to whether or not
their framers had federal habeas corpus proceedings in mind. Such
proceedings tend to vitiate the certainty of any "final determination."
Generally, however, when appeals have been exhausted, the final deter-
mnation is considered to have taken place and 'the statutory time limits
take effect.
The time periods vary a great deal:22 fifteen days in Delaware;
thirty days in West Virginia; six months in Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota,
and Washington; one year in Hawaii and California; three years in
Connecticut; five years in Louisiana; six years in Nevada and Wiscon-
sin; ten years in Oregon and Vermont. These time limits are merely
the mandatory minimum standards which must be adhered to before
exhibits may be released or destroyed. Indications are, however, that
many exhibits, especially weapons, are kept years in excess of the
"Connecticut, Georgia, Missouri, New Jersey, Pennsylvania.
mArkansas, Indiana, Kansas, Maryland, North Carolina, Wyoming.
^See Appendix. Six other states have statutes which in some way cover the sub-
ject, but no time limits are prescribed. They are: Florida, Illinois, Kentucky, Mis-
sissippi, New York, and Oklahoma.
=See statutes as cited in appendix.
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limits actually prescribed by the statutes. In thirteen of the fifteen
states, it is still necessary for the custodian of the exhibits to petition
the court for an order authorizing the disposition of the exhibits
after the statutory provisions are satisfied.23 Connecticut and Vermont
do not require a court order, although Vermont does require the sanc-
tion of the public records commission.2 4 Iowa, Kansas and Nevada
required approval of the prosecuting attorney in addition to the order
of the court.
25
Practice in Jurisdictions Without Statutes
Where no statute covers the subject, the disposition of the exhibits
is largely a matter of discretion for the clerk or other custodian. He is
often guided by custom in his locality, personal experience or a histor-
ical predilection to preserve such articles. Sectional replies from nine
of the twenty-six states which have no statutes indicate that generally
exhibits are kept until the time for any further appeal has passed or the
clerk believes the case has reached its final determination.
26
Such a time period will of necessity, vary according to the states'
regulation of the time allowed for perfecting an appeal. With no
statutory sanction for releasing exhibits, custodians tend to keep them
longer than necessary. The exhibits are kept for an indefinite period
in various sections of nine states27 and in Alfred, Maine, exhibits have
been kept in storage since Maine became a state in 1820.28 Likewise, in
Brigham City, Utah, exhibits have been retained since the late 18oo's29
nThis is not necessarily a part of the particular code provision in those states.
The letters indicate that such a practice is followed in Delaware, West Virginia,
New Jersey, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Washington, Hawaii, California, Louisiana,
Nevada, Orgeon, Wisconsin.
O'Letter from Alma F. Sherwin, Clerk, Addison County Court, Middlebury,
Vermont (no date); Letter from John D. Labelle, States Attorney, Hartford, Con-
necticut, Aug. io, 1962.
2 See Appendix. In the Fletcher case, approval was given by the prosecuting
attorney, but the defense attorney claimed he should have been notified of the
pending destruction of the exhibits.
-GPine Bluff, Arkansas; Twin Falls and Boise, Idaho; Elkhart and Indianapolis,
Indiana; Kansas City and St. Louis, Missouri; Lewistown, Montana; Greensboro,
North Carolina; Oklahoma City, Oklahoma; Alexandria, Culpeper, Lexington,
Spotsylvania, Virginia; Cheyenne, Wyoming.
wNome, Alaska; Colorado Springs and Denver, Colorado; Macon, Georgia;
Alfred, Maine; Lisbon and Valley City, North Dakota; Brigham City, Utah; Sioux
Falls, South Dakota; McCormick, South Carolina; Laramie, Wyoming.
21Letter from Ralph H. Ross, Clerk, Superior Court, Alfred, Maine, July 12,
1962.
"9Letter from K. B. Olsen. Clerk, County Court, Brigham City, Utah, July 31,
1962.
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Unique sectional practices are also in force. If no agreement is
made between the prosecuting and defense attorneys regarding the
exhibits, the clerk in Birmingham, Alabama, keeps them in his files
for an indefinite period.30 Some exhibits are kept by the court reporter
who, upon the completion of the trial, turns them over to the clerks,3'
and others are kept by the clerk until the appeal period is over, at
which time they are returned to the attorneys.32 The storage problem
.created by the exhibits prompted the clerk in Concord New Hamp-
shire, to adopt a procedure whereby exhibits which are kept longer
than six years may be destroyed,33 and the clerks in Ohio and Pennsyl-
vania maintain the exhibits until they receive an order from the court
authorizing final disposition.34 As in the Fletcher case, this order may
be made by an ex parte motion by the prosecutor who feels the ex-
hibits are no longer of any legal or evidential value. Rhode Island,
by statute, authorizes the superior courts to adopt their own court
rules.35 The rules of the Superior Court in Providence authorize the
withdrawal of the exhibits by the attorneys after the final disposition,36
while exhibits in Newport are kept for twenty years.37 Court rules
established in Denver, Colorado, require evidence to be kept a mini-
mum period of thirty days before being disposed of,38 while the pro-
cedure in Colorado Springs is not based on any time limit.39
Of twenty-six states without statutory provisions covering dispo-
sition, the practice in twenty-two is to dispose of physical exhibits only
under court order.40
3°Letter from Julian Swift, Clerk, Tenth Judicial Circuit of Alabama, Birm-
ingham, Alabama, July 5, 1962.
'Letter from Frank W. Hales, Clerk, Circuit Court for Worchester County,
Snow Hill, Maryland, July 9, 1962.
'OLetter from Wm. A. Bliar, Clerk, Atlantic County Court, Atlantic City, New
Jersey, July io, 1962.
:Letter from S. Callahan, Clerk, Superior Court, Concord, New Hampshire,
received July io, 1962.
"4Letter from Win. Luke Leonard, Chief Deputy, County of Hamilton, Cin-
cinnati 2, Ohio, July 6, 1962. See court order in Fletcher case supra at note 5.
1R. I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 8-6-2 (1956).
-"Letter from Robert A. Coogan, Administrative Clerk, Providence County Court
House, Providence, Rhode Island, Sept. 12, 1962.
='Letter from Chester A. Oakley, Jr., Clerk, Superior Court, Newport County
Court, Newport, Rhode Island, received Aug. 1, 1962.
sLetter from Thomas B. Finn, Jr., Chief Deputy Clerk, District Court, Second
judicial District of the State of Colorado, Denver, Colorado, July 6, t962.
'Letter from Francis J. Cuckow, reporter, District Court for Fourth Judicial
Circuit, Colorado Springs, Colorado, Aug. 13, 1962.
40Alaska, Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Idaho, Indiana, Maine Maryland, Mis-
sissippi, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota,
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Disposition proceedings in the four states in which the official
sanction of the court is not required are very much a matter in the
discretion of -the custodian.41 Detroit, Michigan, follows an exacting
procedure in determining which exhibits are of no judicial value.42 In
this city, no court order being required, the objects are held until the
detective in charge of the case indicates that he 'has no further use for
them. If a case has not been solved, the items obtained by the investi-
gating officers, are kept by the police property clerk until the statute
of limitations on the crime has run. If there is no statute of limitations
concerning a particular crime, they are kept until the crime is solved.
In order to prevent the useless accumulation of exahibits, a modern
procedure is carried out by the Detroit Police Property Lieutenant:
All Items are described on I.B.M. cards and every six months
these cards are sent out to the detective in charge of the case,
and, if he has no further use for the article and cannot locate the
rightful owner or (as in the case of weapons, return them to the
owner), the detective signs the article off as no longer needed
and it is turned over to the property office for disposition.4 3
Methods of Disposition
After the physical exhibits have been kept the required statutory
or customary time period, they are disposed of in various ways. The
nature of the exhibit, its inherent value, its prior owner, and the
possible historical crime detecting value are all indicators which guide
the custodian's final disposition of the articles. The letters from a
few of the sources present a sampling of the methods of general dispo-
sition:
(1) Los Angeles, California:
Another successful county clerk's annual auction of criminal
exhibits was held on May 19, 1962, in -the basement of the Hall
of Justice. This auction takes place on the 3rd Sat. of May each
year. The articles sold consist of any saleable item which has
been received into evidence as an exhibit and which has not
been claimed by the owner within one year following the dispo-
sition of a criminal case.44
Oklahoma, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah,
Virginia.
"Georgia, Michigan, Missouri, Wyoming.
"Letter from Gerald Perman, Detroit, Michigan Police Department, Aug. 8,
1962.
"Ibid.
"Letter from E. G. Hatcher, Chief Criminal Division, County Courthouse,
Los Angeles, California, July iS, 1962.
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(2) Denver, Colorado:
As a practical matter, such real evidence has a habit of accumu-
lating. Therefore, periodically due to the problem of storage
we dispose of such accumulation in the best way possible. Less
than a year ago approximately fifteen dump loads of exhibits
were 'hauled to the city dump.4 5
(3) Kent County, Delaware:
He [the clerk]informs me that all exhibits are held until the
time for appeal expires. Then the state exhibits are immediately
turned over to the attorney general. The Defendant's exhibits
are held for the same length of time, but no letter is sent re-
questing defendant to pick up his exhibits. If the defendant fails
to pick up his exhibits, they are not disposed of by court order,
but are kept indefinitely.
4 6
(4) Honolulu, Hawaii:
The usual procedure in First Circuit Court is to have either the
prosecutor's office or defendant's counsel request a withdrawal
of the evidence, which must be approved by the presiding judge.




The clerk makes a list of all exhibits eligible to be destroyed
with their case number and exhibit number. Photos of all exhi-
bits to be destroyed are taken, and ,then filed -in the individual
files pertaining to the exhibits. The court orders those exhibits
destroyed by burning or burying. The sheriff is instructed to do
this with the circuit clerk and state's attorney as witnesses. This
certification is filed in the clerk's office.
48
(6) Des Moines, Iowa:
After the case is disposed of and the property is unclaimed, the
clerk is to turn over to the county auditor any evidence he has,
and the auditor, along with the Board of Supervisors, sells the
items and applies the proceeds to the county poor fund. Some
of the items I turned over to the auditor not long ago were sold
by our board; the big share of it was burned.
4 9
"Letter from Thomas B. Finn, Jr., supra note 38.
'oLetter from Nicholas H. Rodriguez, Esq., Dover, Delaware, Aug. 2o, 1962.
'Letter from Lawrence R. Holt, Chief Circuit Court Clerk, First Circuit Court,
Honolulu, Hawaii, Aug. 7, 1962.
'3Letter from John T. Curry, Circuit Clerk, Macon County, Decatur, Illinois,
July 12, 1962.
'9Letter from Michael H. Doyle, Clerk of the District Court, Polk County,
Des Moines, Iowa, July 17, 1962.
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Property of Third Parties
Exhibits belonging to a third party generally are returned to the
owner.5 0 Because the continuity of the evidence must be preserved,
he must normally wait until all possible appeals are over. Generally
he only needs to present proper identification and proof of ownership,
but the consent of the prosecuting attorney is also required in Alaska,
Louisiana, Minnesota, and Missouri.51 If the owner fails to claim his
property at the proper time or within prescribed statutory limits,
sixty days in Oregon and six months in Washington, the articles may
be sold.52 However, the owner may recover the value of the property
sold if he makes satisfactory proof of ownership within six years in
the former state or three years in the latter state.53 In spite of time-
tested procedures the seemingly routine process of returning evidence
to a third-party owner still presents problems.
54
Money belonging to third parties is in form of real evidence which
should be returned as soon as possible. If it is marked at the time it
is admitted into evidence, its return is no problem. The serial numbers
are retained and its is returned to the lawful owner. Unclaimed money
is generally placed in county funds.5 5 Problems arise when the money
used as evidence is possibly the property of several victims of the same
criminal. If the money is not easily identifiable, the victims must file
attachment proceedings and litigate their rights to the money.5 6 As
has been noted, the Oregon and Washington statues provide for the
owners' recovery of previously forfeited -money.
A letter from Kansas presents an interesting commentary on the
problems inherent in returning property to third parties:
5OThis question was given consideration by twenty-six of the custodians who
responded to the inquiry. Each indicated the owner of such property will normally
get it back.
5It must be borne in mind that this may not be the statewide procedure.
62See Appendix where statutes are listed.
Mlbid.
"Letter from Ralph T. Ross, note 28 supra.
"Only three or four weeks ago we had the occasion of returning money and
diamonds to the estate of a deceased, following a murder trial. Since this was a
novel question, the matter was taken up by and between numerous justices of our
Superior Court and the Chief Justice of our Supreme Judicial Court. The serial
numbers were taken from all of the bills and photographs of the diamonds were
taken at Headquarters of the Maine State Police, and same were placed on file.
Following this procedure, the bills, coins and diamonds were properly returned to
the heirs of the deceased who had been murdered."
nCovered by statutory provisions in Louisiana, Oregon and Washington. See
Appendix.
"Letter from Elmo M. Hargrave, Supervisor, Police Legal Section, Kansas City,
Missouri, Aug. 15, 1962.
NOTE
You might be interested to know the source from which most re-
quests for evidence to be disposed of come. The first sources are
the police departments or sheriff's department, because they have
a storage problem and they cannot indefinitely keep large bulky
items. We ordinarily then have requests from victims for the
return of their property. Then we have insurers of property
taken by burglaries who wish to salvage the property and re-
cover their loss. Next we have requests from people who have
had automobiles stolen. Strangely, the automobiles themselves,
probably because they are very bulky, unless they have some
special use as evidence are ordinarily returned to the owner al-
most immediately upon recovery.
5 7
Property of the Accused
Generally when a criminal is convicted, his personal property
and other possessions which have been used as evidence are not re-
turned to him.58 They are either sold, destroyed, or kept until such
time as the prisoner is released from incarceration. If he is acquitted,
his property will be returned.59 In many cases, whether or not the prop-
erty is returned to ,the prisoner depends on its nature. If it is a deadly
weapon or is contraband, as a matter of general policy, it is not re-
leased. If it is used only for purposes of identification with the scene
of the crime, it may be returned. 60
Disposition According to the Nature of the Article
Specifically, different articles of evidence are handled according
to the nature of the articles involved. Weapons are either destroyed,6'
turned over to the various law enforcement agencies for use in train-
ing,62 turned over to laboratories for study,63 sold at public auctions
"Letter from Keith Sanborn, County Attorney, Sedgwick County, Wichita,
Kansas, August 8, 1962.
r"This question was given consideration in eleven replies. Replies from Colorado,
Connecticut, Illinois, Kansas, Virginia, and West Virginia indicated that the
property is not returned to the accused during his confinement after conviction. Items
are returned to defense counsel in Kentucky, Louisiana, Missouri, North Carolina
and South Dakota.
5'Generally returned on acquittal in: Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, Iowa,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Missouri, North Carolina, South Dakota, Virginia, West
Virginia.
e'Letter from Edward K. Washington, Solicitor, Twelfth Solicitorial District,
Greensboro, North Carolina, July 5, 1962.
"California, Colorado, Connecticut, Michigan. Letter from Gerald Perman,
supra note 42, indicates weapons are melted in furnaces of Ford Plant in Detroit.
OColorado, Hawaii, Kentucky, Louisiana, North Carolina, Virginia.
"North Carolina.
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to help defer government costs, 64 or returned to the owner if he can
prove that he had nothing to do with the instrument's use in the
crime.65 An added problem is sometimes encountered concerning
weapons, because detectives and police officers like to keep them as
mementoes of the crimes they have solved. 66 Liquor which is open is
destroyed, or turned over to the Sheriff's department. 67 Unopened
bottles may be given for use in hospitals.68 If it is saleable liquor, it
may be sold and the proceeds paid to a school or other local fund.6 9
Narcotics are turned over to state and federal narcotics agents.70 As
has been noted, many unclaimed articles with no inherent value are
destroyed by being burned, buried or thrown in nearby rivers. The
method of destruction depends mainly upon the destructive processes
most accessible to the custodian. Items such as footprints, fingerprints
and other exhibits prepared by law enforcement agencies are either re-
turned to .the agency for maintenance or destroyed.
Federal Courts
The Federal District Courts are not constrained to follow any
specific regulation concerning disposition of exhibits.71 Congress has
authorized the District Courts to adopt their own rules of court. Once
the jury has returned a verdict, the property is surrendered to the
United States Attorney and the disposition normally rests in the ex-
ercise of his discretion. The United States Attorney may move or pe-
tition the court to enter an order for the disposition of -the exhibits.
The court may direct the United States Marshall to destroy the evi-
dence or return it to its rightful owner. Where federal agencies are
involved, evidence submitted by them is returned and final disposition
is made by the agency.7 2
The Federal District Court for the District of Columbia has no
set procedure. However, consideration is being given to a recommenda-
tion of the court for the adoption of a rule similar to that in force in






7°California and New Hampshire.
7"Letter from Herbert J. Miller, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Dept. of Justice,
Washington, D.C., Aug. 31, 1962.
nIbid.
NOTE
the United States Circuit Court of the District of Columbia.73 The
Circuit Court rule provides:
Models, diagrams, and exhibits of material must be removed
within 3o days after decision. All models, diagrams and exhibits
of material placed in the custody of the clerk for the inspection
of the court on the hearing of a case must be removed by the
parties within thirty days after the case is decided. When this is
not done, it shall be the duty of the clerk to notify counsel in
the case, by mail or otherwice of the requirements of this rule;
and, if the articles are not removed within a reasonable time
after the notice is given, the clerk shall destroy them or make
such other disposition of them as to him may seem best.7 4
Similar rules are in effect in each of the federal circuit courts,
but the time limits are different in each circuit; fifteen days after
notice,v thirty days,76 one month,77 or a reasonable time.7 8 Exhibits
which have been presented to the United States Supreme Court must
be taken away by the parties within forty days after the case is de-
cided.79
The clerks in the state courts indicated that generally those exhibits
which are sent on for state appellate or federal proceedings are re-
turned to the local court house and disposed of in accordance with
the state statute or local custom.
Military Courts
Property which has ben used as evidence in a military trial has
usually been acquired by the military police as a result of an investi-
gation8s It is their duty to carefully list all such articles promptly
after acquisition and in the presence of a third party witness. The
property is then turned over to the custodian who is responsible for
its safekeeping and maintenance both before and after the trial. When
the property has been used in a legal proceeding and is no longer
"Letter from Harry M. Hull, Clerk, United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia, Washington, D.C., July 5, 1962.
7'General Rules of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, 28
U.S.C.D.C. Cir. R. 22 (b).
-Eighth Cir. R. 9 (b). This rule and those which follow are in 28 U.S.C. Rules.
-6D. C. Cir. R. 22 (b).
7 2 nd Cir. R. x6; 4th Cir. R. 26; 5 th Cir. R. 34; 7 th Cir. R. 18 (c); 9th Cir. R.t6; io Cir. R. 3o.
78sSt Cir. R. 36; 3rd Cir. R. 37; 6th Cir. R. 28.
,'Sup. Ct. Rules, R. 38.
'0AR-i9o-22. The material for the discussion of the military procedure is based
on the provisions of this regulation.
1963]
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useful or needed as evidence, the custodian must make a written
request to the appropriate commander for its disposition. As in the
state courts, the final determination of the case marks the time when
the custodian may proceed with the disposition proceedings.
Property wlich belongs to a third party is kept for 12o days after
written notice of the pending disposition has been made to the owner
or his legal representative. 8' If the owner does not acknowledge the
notice, the property is disposed of after the expiration of one year from
the time it came into the possession of the last custodian. Claims for
property may be made prior to disposal and claims for funds may be
made to the finance officer one year after disposal. Claims thereafter
must be made to the General Accounting Office. After the expiration of
five years from the date of disposal, all such claims are barred.
Property which belongs to the accused, other than government
property, is kept in safekeeping and transferred with him from one
confinement facility to another.82 It may, however, be disposed of in
other ways, as directed by the prisoner. If requested by the prisoner,
the property may be shipped to a person designated by him, sold
and the money paid into an account for the prisoner, donated to a
charity, or destroyed.
As in the state courts, some property is disposed according to the
nature of the article. United States weapons and other government
property are returned to the general property depot. Private weapons
and contraband property, such as counterfeit bills and narcotics, are
turned over to the appropriate federal agency. Generally the procedure
is the same as that already noted in the discussion of state disposition
according to the nature of the exhibit.
Conclusion
Although showing an awareness of the need for maintaining physi-
cal exhibits for possible use in a future trial, the custodians indicate
that there are difficult problems involved. The storage burden is con-
stantly increasing and a need for more storage facilities has been ex-
pressed. The establishment of a regional warehouse exclusively for the
storage of criminal exhibits or the use of more photographs are pos-
sible solutions.
Somewhat different from the maintenance problem is one which




maintained for many years. If there is any likelihood of a new trial,
the continuity of possession must be preserved. A State's Attorney in
Connecticut writes:
"As a matter of fact, that evidence which we hold, but which is
actually the property of a person who desires its return must be
returned at the conclusion of the expiration of the appeal fol-
lowing trial. Consequently, the return of it will immediately
stop any continuity of the condition of same. That would make
it inadmissible in a new trial."8 3
A third problem arises from the need to store exhibits which should
have been withdrawn by the parties. In Oregon, the attorneys are au-
thorized to withdraw their exhibits soon after the time for appeal has
expired. If they fail to do so, the clerk is faced with a storage burden
for ten years.8 4 Of course the clerk should maintain exhibits where
the peculiar circumstances of the case indicate long-time storage is nec-
essary, but the storage burden is not really alleviated when exhibits are
kept longer than necessary. There is little sense in keeping exhibits
used to convict a man who has since died- other than those exhibits
which may be of historical significance such as the exhibits used
in the trials of Aaron Burr, the assassins of Lincoln and McKinley,
or Alger Hiss. When such items are involved, it would, of course, be
worthwhile checking with an historical records commission as is the
practice in Vermont.
The important problem discussed here, however, is the need for
preserving the exhibits for a future trial. If the exhibits are not avail-
able for a future trial, an unmerited acquittal may well result.8 5 It
is, of course, impossible to anticipate those cases which will never be
contested. It is not at all uncommon today for a man to assert his con-
stitutional rights through a habeas corpus proceeding many years after
his conviction. It would seem, then, that in order to alleviate the prob-
lems inherent in the proper maintenance of physical exhibits there
are two alternatives. Either all exhibits must be kept and properly
maintained until the prisoner has died, or some sort of limitation
"Letter from Arthur T. Gorman, State's Attorney, New Haven County, New
Haven, Connecticut, Aug. 3, 1962.8 Letter from Si Cohn, County Clerk, Multnomah County, Portland, Oregon,
July 12, 1962.
"The preservation of such exhibits would also, of course, protect the rights of
an accused if any subsequent retrial were to take place. The exhibits in the cus-
tody of the clerk would also undoubtedly include some which might well establish
the innocence of an accused. This was in fact one of the basic points raised by
Fletcher's attorney when he moved to quash the indictment.
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must be imposed regarding appeals which would insure the safe
destruction of exhibits after a certain time period has elapsed. What
is needed then is a statute of limitations which would limit the time
within which a habeas corpus proceeding could be brought. An
amendment to chapter 153 of Title 28 of the United States Code
could provide that no such petition for a writ of habeas corpus could
be made unless initiated within a certain number of years from the
date of the "final determination" of a prisoner's case. Such a provision
would not be an undue infringement on the rights of a prisoner. The
amendment would, of course, have to work both prospectively and
retrospectively. Its application would bar the claims of those in prison
who claim a violation of their constitutional rights because a later court
decision has changed the law from what it was when they were tried
perhaps twenty-five or thirty years ago. There is no logical reason to
conclude that because a modern court has indicated a modern trend
in constitutional thinking, a prisoner was mistreated or not given a fair
hearing of his case in a former generation. In short, such a provision
would simply state that the claims normally inherent in any petition
for a writ of habeas corpus would have -to be made within a certain
number of years from the date of the final determination of the case
through normal appellate channels.
A limitation such as that advocated is now in force in 'the Illinois
post-conviction act.8 6 The act provides for a five-year liimtation
period during which the prisoner may take advantage of the extra-
ordinary processes provided by the state. The comments of an Illinois
clerk8 7 indicate that the five year limit was considered tb be ample time
for a prisoner to raise his complaints of denials of constitutional due
process.
A five year limitation period is prescribed, with provision for
discretionary relaxation under unusual circumstances of hard-
ship which are not susceptible to precise enumeration.... A
three year period is provided as to judgments rendered prior to
the promulgation of the Act because that period was regarded as
entirely sufficient (particularly in view of the provisions for flex-
ibility in hardship cases) for prisoners already incarcerated.
Five years was felt to be too long a time in such cases.88
6Il1. Ann. Stat. ch. 38, §§ 826-832 (Smith-Hurd ig6 Supp.).
6'Albert E. Jenner, Jr. He was chairman of the committee of the Chicago and
Illinois State Bar Associations which prepared the draft for the proposed rule of
court providing for post- conviction hearings.
Jenner, The Illinois Post Conviction Hearing Act, Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 38, (Smith-
Hurd 1961 Supp.) at 329, 342.
NOTE
For'any limitation such as this to be effective, it would of course
be necessary that some correlation be established between the period
written into the federal statute and the period of limitations in the
state provisions. Adequate and complete state provisions would tend
to lessen somewhat the heavy flow of habeas corpus petitions which
tend to impede the federal judiciary's dispatch of other business.
A statute of limitations is, however, feasible.8 9 It would allow the
exploration of procedures which would insure competent and uniform
maintenance of exhibits for possible future trials and the systematic
disposal of such exhibits at the expiration of the time limit prescribed
in the statute of limitations. Unless this procedure is adopted there ap-
pears to be no feasible alternative to indefinite storage of real evidence













































Cal. Penal Code §§1417-1419
None
Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. § 54-36
(1958).
Del. Super. Ct. (Crim.) R. 56 (c).
None
Fla. Stat. Ann. § goi.ig (944).
None
Hawaii Rev. Laws § 215-29
(1955). Also Rule 7, Rules of
Cir. Ct. of 1st Cir., "Withdrawal
of Papers and Exhibits."
None
Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 11o, § 2o.2o
(Smith Hurd 1956).
None
Iowa Code §§ 645, 751 (1962).
Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 261o-
2617 (Supp. x961).
"At first blush such a proposal does seem to be a great deprivation of
rights. However, viewed in light of the possibility of an absolute right to counsel
as essential to any conviction, it does not seem improper to deny convicted persons
the opportunity to sleep on their rights. See contra this argument: Torcia and
King, The Mirage of Retroactivity and Changing Constitutional Concepts, 66 Dick.
L. Rev. 269 (1962). But see also, Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas
Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 441, 517 (1963).
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Ky. Rev. Stat. § 435.235 (1955)
La'. Acts, 196o, No. 327.
None
None
Rules & Orders of Mass. Superior
Court, 1956 R. iio, iii. See
XLI Mass. Law Quart. No. i p.
ix.
None
Minn. Stat. §§ 48o-499 (1957).









N.Y. Pub. Health Laws §§ 3352.




Okla. Stat. tit. 12 § 956.4 (1951).
Ore. Rev. Stat. §§ 7.120, 142.040,
142.o6o, 166.28o (Supp. 1961).
None










Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, § 454
(1959 Rev.).
None
Wash. Sess. Laws ig6i, ch. 104
§§ 1-4 at 158.
W. Va. Code Ann. § 5750 (1961).
Wis. Stat. § 59.715 (Supp. 1961).
None
